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Extended Cognition in Science Communication
Abstract: The aim of this article is to propose a methodological externalism that takes knowledge about science to be 
partly  constituted  by the  environment.  My starting  point  is  the  debate  about  extended cognition  in  contemporary 
philosophy and cognitive science. Externalists claim that human cognition extends beyond the brain and can be partly 
constituted by external devices. First, I show that most studies of public knowledge about science are based on an  
internalist framework that excludes the environment we usually utilize to make sense of science and does not allow the  
possibility  of  extended  knowledge.  In  a  second  step,  I  argue  that  science  communication  studies  should  adopt  a  
methodological externalism and accept that knowledge about science can be partly realized by external information 
resources such as Wikipedia. 
Keywords:  cognition,  cognitive  extension,  cognitive  technology,  deficit  model,  knowledge,  philosophy of  science 
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Since the end of the 20th century, traditional accounts of cognition have come under increasing 
criticism by an externalist movement that argues that human cognition extends beyond the organism 
and  can  be  partly  constituted  by  the  environment.  According  to  externalists,  philosophers  and 
cognitive scientists have been misguided by the idea that human cognition is entirely located in the 
brain and have been blind for how reasoning, problem solving, and other abilities are entangled 
with and dependent  on the the environment.  The aim of this  article is  to utilize the externalist 
framework to formulate an approach to science communication that rests on an extended concept of 
knowledge. I argue that a thorough externalism has a far reaching impact on science communication 
as  it  implies  that  external  information  resources  such  as  Wikipedia  or  Google  can  constitute 
extended knowledge about scientific issues. Furthermore, I try to show that a reformulated and 
extended concept  of  knowledge fits  the needs  of  science communication better  than traditional 
accounts of knowledge and scientific literacy.
Proponents of extended cognition claim that cognitive processes can extend beyond the boundaries 
of the organism and often illustrate their position with a large variety of examples that involve very 
different  kinds  of  cognitive  processes.  One popular  example  is  the  use of  a  pen and paper  to 
perform long multiplication (e.g. Wilson and Clark 2006). When using a pen and paper for long 
multiplication,  a  lot  of  cognitive  labor  is  transferred  from the  brain  to  external  processes.  For 
example, all the intermediate results that add up to the final result are not stored in the biological 
memory but on a sheet of paper. Proponents of extended cognition argue that we should think of the 
cognitive process of multiplying as being composed of processes that are internal as well as external 
to  the  organism.  There  is  no  reason  to  think  that  only  neural  processes  can  realize  cognitive 
processes.
While externalist accounts usually try to defend the concept of extended cognition with respect to 
very different kinds of cognitive processes, this article will focus almost exclusively on knowledge. 
The  most  discussed  example  of  extended  knowledge  in  contemporary  literature  is  a  thought 
experiment of Otto who suffers from Alzheimer’s and relies on a notebook as a substitute for his  
lost  biological  memory  (Clark  and  Chalmers  1998).  According  to  externalists,  Otto  uses  the 
information in his notebook in a very similar way as people with a healthy brain use their biological  
memory and we should accept his notebook as an extended memory.
The  main  claim  of  this  article  is  that  science  communication  will  benefit  from  a  thorough 
externalism and a robust notion of extended knowledge. The potentially radical consequences of 
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this proposal become clear when we move from thought experiments such as Otto’s notebook to 
large  information  resources  such  as  Wikipedia.  If  we  take  externalism  seriously,  external 
information resources such as Wikipedia may become storages of external knowledge.  In one of his 
popular  “xkcd”  webcomics,  cartoonist  Randall  Munroe  provides  a  nice  illustration  of  this 
possibility by describing the effects of Wikipedia’s server outages on his problem solving abilities 
(see figure 1): While he is usually able to impress other people with detailed knowledge of obscure 
topics, the disrupted access to Wikipedia makes him incapable of dealing with even the simplest 
problems. 
The title of his comic-strip, “The Extended Mind”, refers to the theoretical context of externalism 
and suggests that Wikipedia is not only a helpful cognitive tool but literally part of his cognitive 
system.  The  aim  of  this  article  is  to  take  this  radical  hypothesis  seriously  and  explore  its 
implications for science communication. I will argue that a radical extension of knowledge through 
external and digital media is actually more plausible than it may appear on first sight and offers a  
methodologically attractive interpretation of the impact of modern technologies on our cognitive 
economies. 
Figure 1 “The Extended Mind” by Randall Munroe (CC BY-NC 2.5 License).
 
 
I “Knowledge about Science”
Although science communication can serve a large variety purposes, there can be little doubt that 
one of its  core functions is  to  increase knowledge about  science.  While  the general  claim that 
science communication should increase knowledge about science may be a truism, the question 
what constitutes knowledge about science remains highly controversial. A cursory look at the recent 
history of science communication studies reveals a large diversity of concepts and the aim of this 
first section is to briefly introduce some influential accounts that will help to put the externalist 
proposal into context.
While science communication is arguably as old as the professionalization of science, it has only 
more recently become a topic of distinct scholarly interest. Walter Bodmer, one of the pioneers of 
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contemporary science communication, argues that for most of the 20th century, popular science was 
not  only irrelevant  but  even  potentially  harmful  for  the  careers  of  young  scientists:  “It  was, 
presumably, more or less acceptable for a Fellow [of the Royal Society] to be a populariser, as this 
could hardly any more tarnish his or her scientific reputation, but for younger scientists, perhaps 
aspiring to election to the Royal Society,  the fear of opprobrium was a definite disincentive to 
becoming too popular”  (Bodmer 2010, 152).
This situation changed profoundly in the 1980s, partly triggered by a research report of the Royal 
Society, today known as the “Bodmer Report” (Bodmer 1985). In 1982, the Royal Society set up a 
working  group  to  evaluate  the  public  understanding  of  science  and  strategies  of  an  improved 
science communication. Published in 1985, the Bodmer Report stressed the duty of scientists to 
communicate their results and the public understanding of science was  presented as  an important 
element in the promotion of national prosperity, the quality of private and public decision making, 
and richness of the lives of individuals (Bodmer 1985). 
As a consequence of the Bodmer-Report, many social scientists began to study scientific literacy 
and public knowledge about science. Two of the most influential studies were carried out by Durant 
et al. in the UK and Miller et al. in the United States. The results of both studies were published in 
Nature (Durant  et  al.  1989)  and  discussed  two  kinds  of  knowledge:  knowledge  about basic  
scientific  facts and methodological  knowledge  about processes  of  scientific  inquiry.  Knowledge 
about  basic  scientific  facts  was  tested  through questions  such as  Does light  travel  faster  than  
sound? Does the liver make urine? Do all insects have eight legs? Methodological knowledge about 
processes of scientific inquiry was tested by asking subjects questions in which they were supposed 
to identify the correct answer in a list. For example, they were presented with the case of a drug 
against high blood pressure that is suspected of not working well and asked how scientists would 
approach the problem. Subjects who chose “Give the drug to some patients but not others. Then  
compare what happens to each group.” from a list of possible answers (“Talk to the patients”...) 
were  taken  to  have  at  least  tacit  knowledge of  the  importance  of  the  experimental  method  in 
scientific inquiry.
The results  of  the studies  were  widely received as  showing an alarmingly low level  of  public 
knowledge about science. For example, Durant et al. found that “only 34% of Britons and 25% of 
Americans appeared to know that the earth goes around the sun once a year, and 23% of Britons and 
25% of Americans knew that antibiotics are ineffective against viruses” (Durant et al. 1989, p.11). 
Given Bodmer’s case for the importance of public understanding of science and the apparently 
widespread misunderstanding of even the most basic scientific facts, there seemed to be an urgent 
need for a public understanding of science movement. 
Although  the  public  understanding  of  science  movement deserves  credit  for  making  science 
communication a topic of wide academic interest, it  soon became criticized as being based on an 
insufficient “deficit model.” According to its critics, public understanding of science efforts focused 
too much on the lack of factual knowledge and were  often blind for  the importance of critical 
engagement  with the role  of science in  society.  Furthermore,  the deficit  model was accused of 
“selling  science”  and  presupposing that  public  scepticism towards  scientific  and  technological 
innovations was based on the public ignorance towards science (Wynne 1992).
The “contextual model” of science communication emerged as an alternative to the “deficit model” 
and aimed  at  a critical  engagement  with  science  and  its  role  in  society  (Miller  2001).  This 
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alternative  also  implied  new  conceptual  strategies.  For  proponents  of  the  “deficit  model”, 
knowledge about science was defined as knowledge about scientific facts and methods. Proponents 
of the contextual model suggested a broader account that not only included knowledge of “the 
formal contents of scientific knowledge; the methods and processes of science” but also “its forms 
of institutional embedding, patronage, organization and control” (Wynne 1992, 42). As the public 
understanding of science movement was only concerned with the first two kinds of knowledge, 
proponents of the contextual model argued that it ended up with narrow minded and insufficient 
concepts of knowledge about science.
The debates about the “deficit model” and “contextual model” of science communication have lead 
to large variety of accounts of knowledge about science that still constitute the framework of many 
theoretical debates about science communication (Sturgis and Allum 2004, Nisbet and Scheufele 
2009, Bubela et al. 2009). Despite the obvious differences between these accounts, I want to argue 
that many of them share an assumption that is the focus of criticism of this article. The assumption I 
want to challenge can be summarized as the idea that knowledge is something entirely internal to 
the organism and that knowledge about science has to be tested independently of the environment 
we usually utilize to make sense of science.  Contrary to this  internalism,  I want to propose an 
externalist  account  that  accepts  externally  stored  information  as  a  potential  part  of  someones 
knowledge system. 
One  way  of  illustrating  the  difference  between  internalism  and  externalism  in  science 
communication is to consider different ways of testing knowledge about science. Internalists will 
rely on test designs that systematically exclude the cognitive environment of the subject. During the 
test, it won’t be allowed to consult Wikipedia or a specialized dictionary, to “google” a key word, to 
call a friend, to use a notebook, and so on. Ideally, an internalist test of knowledge takes place in the 
controlled  environment  of  a  laboratory  where  all  of  these  “confounding  factors”  can  be 
systematically excluded. An externalist account of science communication is based on the idea that 
this way of testing knowledge about science is not helpful and should be replaced with an account 
that incorporates at least parts of the cognitive environment as relevant for a subject’s knowledge.
The externalist proposal challenges most studies of public knowledge about science. The public 
understanding of science studies of the 1980s focused on basic knowledge of scientific facts and 
methods without considering the environment as something that could legitimately constitute a part 
of a  subject’s  understanding of science.  The same is  true for more recent studies that  combine 
aspects  of  the  contextual  model  with  quantitative  accounts.  Sturgis  and  Allum’s  (2004),  for 
example,  offer  an  account  of  contextualist  knowledge  by  combining  traditional  measures  of 
knowledge  about  scientific  facts  and  methods  with  studies  of  political  knowledge.  For  their 
“measure of political knowledge, [they] use a six-item scale tapping respondent knowledge of the 
policy stances of the main political parties in Great Britain” (62). While this political knowledge is 
obviously not identical with contextual knowledge about science, Stugies and Allum argue that it 
“will  likely act  as  [a]  reasonably good prox[y]:  people  who are  knowledgeable  about  political  
parties and the issue positions they endorse, are also more likely to be familiar with existing forms 
of scientific regulation, government committee structures, and the nature of links between science, 
industry, and government and so forth” (60). Sturgis and Allum’s account also clearly presupposes 
an  internalist  framework:  contextualist  knowledge  is  not  defined  through  the  often  heavily 
environment-depended strategies that people use to make sense of science in society but through a 
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test that systematically excludes cognitive strategies that rely on the environment.
Similar points can be made with respect to studies of scientific literacy. Although the debate about 
the concept “scientific literacy” is as complex as the debate about “public understanding of science” 
(see DeBoer 2000), the conceptual framework of the 2006 PISA test offers a good and often used 
example of contemporary accounts of scientific literacy. The PISA test defined scientific literacy as 
an individual’s
• Scientific knowledge and use of that knowledge to identify questions, acquire new knowledge,  
explain scientific phenomena and draw evidence-based conclusions about science-related issues
• Understanding of the characteristic features of science as a form of human knowledge
and enquiry
• Awareness of how science and technology shape our material, intellectual, and cultural
environments
• Willingness to engage in science-related issues and with the ideas of science, as a reflective 
citizen (OECD 2006, 23)
While this is clearly a quite complex model, the PISA-test also measures scientific literacy in an  
internalist  framework  as  students  are  required  to  answer  questions  in  a  standardized  test 
environment  that  excludes  helpful  resources  of  the  students’ normal  cognitive  environment  - 
cellphones, friends, books, computers, parents, magazines, teachers, and so on. Although the PISA 
test  also  asked  students  about  their  social  context,  the  test  was  carried  out  in  a  controlled 
environment that only provided “pencils, erasers, rulers, and in some cases calculators” (OECD 
2006b, 28).
Contemporary science communication studies offer heterogeneous conceptual frameworks as the 
different but closely related concepts “scientific literacy”, “public understanding of science”, and 
“public knowledge about science” illustrate. Furthermore, these concepts are often interpreted in 
different ways along the distinction between a deficit model and contextual model. However, it still  
seems that at least a majority of them rely on an internalist framework that excludes the normal 
cognitive environment of subjects. 
If  the majority of  quantitative studies  relies on an internalist  framework,  one may assume that 
externalist  approach is somehow generally opposed to attempts to measure “scientific literacy”, 
“public  understanding  of  science”,  or  “public  knowledge  about  science”.  Does  the  externalist 
alternative imply that we can only approach these topics with qualitative case studies? I don’t think 
so and I will argue in the following sections that one of the main reasons for adopting externalism is 
that it will actually lead to more meaningful test designs. In next section, I will introduce external 
cognition as it is discussed in contemporary philosophy and cognitive science. 
II External Cognition: Metaphysical and Methodological Issues
Recent  debates  about  external  cognition  are  strongly  influenced  by  Andy  Clark  and  David 
Chalmers’ landmark paper “The Extended Mind” (1998) that argues that human cognition literally 
extends  beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  organism  and  is  partly  constituted  by  the  subject’s 
environment. Consider, for example, Clark and Chalmers’ now famous example of Otto who suffers 
from a mild case of Alzheimer’s and uses a notebook as a substitute for his lost biological memory. 
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Otto wants to go to the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA), consults his notebook, and goes to 53rd 
street.  Compare Otto to  Inga who also wants to go to the MoMA but  has a healthy biological 
memory and does not need a notebook to remember the address. 
It is tempting to describe the difference between Inga and Otto as a difference between knowing and 
not-knowing: Inga actually knows the address of the MoMA because she has the information stored 
in her biological memory and can access the information when she needs it. Otto does not know the 
address until he looks it up in his notebook - the notebook is not a literally a part of his memory but 
rather a tool for his cognitive system. But why is the spatial location of the information storage so 
important?  Why does  Inga’s  biologically  stored  information  constitute  knowledge while  Otto’s 
external information storage does not constitute knowledge until he looks the information up and 
makes it part of his biological short-term memory? 
Clark and Chalmers argue that the location of the information storage is actually not that important 
and that the cases of Otto and Inga are not as different as they may appear at first. Otto uses his 
notebook  in  a  very  similar  way  as  Inga  uses  her  biological  memory  and  both  cases  are 
systematically analogous in important aspects: “First, the notebook is a constant in Otto's life - in cases 
where the information in the notebook would be relevant, he will rarely take action without consulting it. 
Second,  the  information  in  the  notebook  is  directly  available  without  difficulty.  Third,  upon  retrieving 
information from the notebook he automatically endorses it. Fourth, the information in the notebook has  
been  consciously  endorsed  at  some  point  in  the  past,  and  indeed  is  there  as  a  consequence  of  this  
endorsement” (1998, 17).
So what is the reason that we consider Inga’s biological memory a  part  of her cognitive system 
while many of us would consider Otto’s notebook a tool for his cognitive system but not a genuine 
part of his memory? According to Clark and Chalmers, there is no systematic justification for this  
distinction and the idea that human cognition must be limited to what goes on in the brain is a 
prejudice we should give up in favour of a more adequate picture of extended cognition. 
Clark and Chalmers’ externalism raises metaphysical questions and worries that are usually of no 
concern for science communicators: Does it make sense to claim that human cognition and the 
human mind literally extend beyond the brain and even the body? What is the metaphysical status 
of cognitive states that are partly constituted by external media such as notebooks? (for a discussion 
of  these  issues  in  the  context  of  modern  technologies  see  Smart  et  al  2010 and  Smart  2012). 
However,  Clark  and Chalmers’ discussion also  raises  methodological  issues  that  directly affect 
science  communication  studies:  Is  it  helpful  to  think  of  knowledge  about  science  as  partly 
constituted by the environment? Should tests designs in science communication studies reflect an 
externalist concept of knowledge?
The  main  goal  of  this  article  is  the  justification  of  a  methodological externalism  in  science 
communication as I do not want to suggest that science communication scholars must endorse a 
specific metaphysical theory of the mind. At the same time, the metaphysical and methodological 
questions are obviously not entirely independent of each other and it will be helpful to consider how 
methodological issues in science communication relate to the metaphysical issues in contemporary 
philosophy of mind. In the following sections, I will argue that we should endorse an externalist 
framework  because  the  internalist  concept  of  knowledge  undermines  the  very  possibility  of 
successful science communication. Internalism sets the bar for knowledge so high that it becomes 
impossible for anyone to have a sufficient amount of knowledge about science. This argument can 
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be interpreted in two ways. According to a  strong interpretation, this argument has metaphysical 
implications: if internalism undermines the prospects of a consistent concept of knowledge about 
science, then at least  some cognitive states (i.e.  knowledge about science) must literally extend 
beyond  the  organism.  According  to  a  weaker  interpretation,  the  argument  only  shows  the 
methodological benefits of an externalist concept of knowledge without having any metaphysical 
implications: maybe externalism is just a pragmatically useful model in science communication that 
turns  out  to  be  insufficient  from  a  metaphysical  point  of  view.  Or,  to  formulate  the  weak 
interpretation  in  terms  common  philosophical  labels:  maybe  we  need  some  fictionalist,  or 
instrumentalist, or quasi-realist account of extended knowledge that acknowledges its usefulness in 
science communication without actually being committed to the existence of extended cognitive 
states. 
Although  I  sympathize  with  a  stronger  interpretation  of  my  argument,  I  want  to  restrict  the 
following discussion to  its  methodological  aspects in  order  to  base the case for  externalism in 
science  communication  on  as  little  controversial  assumptions  as  possible.  And  even  if 
methodological externalism does not have radical metaphysical consequences, it still turns out to be 
radical  in  other  ways.  This  becomes  evident  when  we  consider  how  externalism  in  science 
communication changes what kind of knowledge we ascribe to subjects. Let us first return to Clark 
and Chalmers’ example of Otto and assume that Otto also often visits the American Museum of 
Natural  History (AMNH).  His  notebook includes  information  on every exhibition  room of  the 
AMNH (e.g. biographical data of naturalists and basic facts about species) and Otto always consults 
his notebook when he visits the museum. Internalists assume that Otto does not actually know the 
information he has stored in the notebook as the information is not stored in his biological memory. 
Externalists, however, argue that the notebook qualifies as a part of Otto’s cognitive system if it is 
used in a specific way: if the access to information through the notebook is functionally analogous 
to the access to information in the biological memory (e.g. the access is quick and reliable), then the 
information in the notebook should also count as part of the belief and knowledge system.   
The example of Otto’s notebook illustrates how internalism and externalism can come to different 
conclusions regarding someones knowledge about science. At the same time, the implications do 
not seem very radical as the example is limited to very specific and uncommon circumstances of 
someone using a notebook as a substitute for normal biological memory. 
However, there are also examples that promise more far-reaching implications. Imagine Otto’s (or 
someone else’s) use of a cell phone with Internet access. While strolling through the ANMH, Otto  
uses his cell phone to retrieve information from Wikipedia. Often, he quickly checks basic facts on 
species, geologic periods, biographical data of scientists, and so on. Does Otto’s quick and reliable 
access to information from Wikipedia mean that he actually knows all of these things? This would 
be a truly radical implication of externalism, as the incorporation of information from Wikipedia 
into Otto’s belief  system would imply a staggering explosion of knowledge. For example, Otto 
would  know  the  biographical  data  of  tens  of  thousands  of  scientists  and  have  at  least  basic 
information on hundreds of thousands of species. He would also know millions of geographical 
coordinates. And so on.
Some externalists try to avoid this explosion of knowledge by adding additional criteria that exclude 
Wikipedia  and  similar  online  resources.  Clark  and  Chalmers,  for  example,  suggest  a  'prior 
endorsement' criterion that would exclude many external information resources by requiring that 
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externally stored knowledge has to be “consciously endorsed at some point in the past” (1998, 17; 
cf.  Clark 2008, 80).  Although externalists  may be able to avoid an explosion of knowledge by 
adding  additional  criteria  such  as  a  'prior  endorsement'  criterion,  I  will  focus  on  a  thorough 
externalism that  accepts  this  surprising  consequence.  In  the  next  section  I  will  argue  that  the 
explosion of knowledge is actually an important asset for externalism and the  very reason why 
science  communication  studies  should  accept  an  externalist  framework.  The  assumption  of  an 
explosion  of  knowledge  is  actually  methodologically  beneficial  as  it  solves  the  “problem  of 
cognitive overload” of the next section. This methodological benefit would vanish if we would add 
criteria  that  restrict  extended  knowledge  in  a  way that  external  information  resources  such  as 
Wikipedia are excluded. 
III The argument from cognitive overload
In  this  section,  I  present  a  simple  argument  in  favour  of  an  externalist  framework  in  science 
communication. I argue that internalism sets the bar for knowledge so high that a sufficient level of  
public knowledge about science becomes outright impossible. As science communication scholars 
should  avoid  conceptual  decisions  that  undermine  the  very  possibility  of  successful  science 
communication, they should employ a more liberal externalist concept of knowledge. 
The most  controversial  premise  of  this  argument  is  the  claim that  internalism sets  the  bar  for 
knowledge so high that it undermines the prospects of successful science communication. In order 
to justify this premise, I first want to discuss what kind of knowledge is necessary for successful 
science communication. As already shown in the last sections, the public understanding of science 
studies of the 1980s focused on two kinds of knowledge: On the one hand knowledge of basic 
scientific facts  such as knowledge that the earth moves around the sun, that antibiotics are not  
effective  against  viruses,  or  that  light  travels  faster  than  sound.  On  the  other  hand  basic 
methodological  knowledge  such  as  the  importance  of  experiments  in  scientific  inquiry. 
Furthermore, I have already presented the contextualist criticism of these studies that insisted that 
successful engagement with science in modern societies also requires knowledge about the social 
embedding of science and the role  of science in  society.  Occasionally,  these different  kinds of 
knowledge  have  been  taken  to  imply  two  rivaling  and  incompatible  accounts  of  science 
communication represented by the deficit model and the contextual model. However, there is no 
reason to think of these different kinds of knowledge as opposed to each other and many more 
recent accounts of science communication consider them complementary instead of rivaling (e.g. 
Sturgis and Allum 2004, Bauer et al. 2007). 
And indeed, if we turn to concrete examples of public engagement with science, all three kinds of 
knowledge seem necessary.  Consider  simple  examples  such as  a  radio  debate  about  the  future 
development of the GDP or an article on the dangers of nuclear energy on a science-blog. To make 
sense  of  these  issues,  one  certainly needs  some  factual  knowledge.  For  example,  one  will  not 
understand a radio debate if one has no idea what a GDP is. In the case of the blog article, one needs 
at least a very basic understanding of what nuclear energy is and what dangers it implies. Although 
some factual knowledge is necessary,  it  certainly isn’t sufficient.  Often, adequate understanding 
requires  some  methodological knowledge,  as  well.  In  the  case  of  a  debate  about  the  future 
development of the GDP, it seems necessary to have a basic understanding of what a forecast is and 
how it differs from other scientific statements. The commentary on the dangers of nuclear energy 
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may make claims about the likeliness of a nuclear catastrophe that require some grasp of probability 
statements. And so on. Even if the contexualists are right that knowledge about facts and methods 
are  not enough, they are often clearly necessary to make sense of scientific issues that affect the 
public. 
At  the  same  time,  the  examples  also  show  that  we  often  have  to  go  beyond  factual  and 
methodological knowledge. Economic forecasts and evaluations of the dangers of nuclear energy 
are tremendously complicated and even informed citizens will have to rely on external resources. 
This dependency on the expertise of others is one of the main reasons why knowledge about the 
social embedding of science is such an important factor in the public engagement with science. 
Given the complexity of scientific issues and their interactions with other aspects of society, we 
almost always rely on the expertise of others. And when we rely on the expertise of others, it is 
often  indispensable  to  know something about  their  social  and institutional  embedding.  Debates 
about  the  economic  policies  or  comments  about  nuclear  energy  are  clear  examples  as  claims 
regarding  these  issues  require  come  contextualisation  through  knowledge  about  the  media 
platforms, about the experts or their institutional embedding.
If we look at individual examples of public engagement with science, the internalist framework 
does not seem to create many problems. Of course, one can acquire sufficient (internally realized) 
knowledge about the dangers of nuclear energy or the GDP even if we employ a complex model 
that includes knowledge about scientific facts, methods, and the social embedding of science. The 
problems of  the  internalist  framework become apparent,  however,  if  we move from individual 
examples to the diversity of scientific issues that are of public importance in a way that they require 
informed decisions by the society at large. There are different ways in which scientific issues can 
require  these  kinds  of  decisions.  First,  scientific  research  can  make  technological  applications 
possible that require a democratic evaluation and legitimation. Many typical examples of science 
communication such as nuclear energy, genetic engineering, nanotechnology, or neuroenhancement 
fall  in  this  category.  Second,  scientific  research  can  also  presuppose decisions  that  need to  be 
evaluated  within  a  society.  Examples  include  scientific  endeavors  that  require  large  financial 
investments such as space exploration or particle accelerators but also research that needs to be 
evaluated in the light of our moral beliefs such as research based on animal testing or embryonic 
stem cells.  Third,  scientific research can also come conclusions that make decisions by the entire 
society necessary. Obvious examples include research on climate change or declining biodiversity. 
Fourth, one could also argue that there is a lot of research that does not require immediate action by 
a society but is still of importance for the self-understanding of individuals. Consider, for example, 
basic  research in  the human sciences that  does not  have any immediate applications but  raises 
fundamental questions such as the nature of consciousness, free will, or the social and/or biological 
foundations of personality.
My sketchy list of scientific topics that affect society in important ways could easily be extended. 
However,  I  think  that  the  main  problem is  already apparent:  Even  if  we  restrict  ourselves  to 
scientific issues that affect society at large, we are still facing an enormous amount of complex and 
highly  diverse  topics.  If  science  communication  aims  at  factual,  methodological,  and  social 
knowledge regarding all of these topics, we seem to set the bar so high that it becomes hard to see  
how science communication  can be successful at all. The point of the argument is not that most 
people do not have this kind of complex knowledge about science. This would not be a surprising 
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claim as many studies have found a low level of public knowledge about science. The point of the 
argument is that we seem to undermine  the very possibility of successful science communication 
given the complexity of required knowledge. Even under ideal circumstances, we could not expect 
the public to have sufficient level knowledge. This problem of a cognitive overload seems to be 
caused by a combination of three claims:
(1)  Complex model:  Science communication should aim at sufficient knowledge about scientific 
facts, methods, and the social embedding of science regarding issues that are important for a society 
at large.
(2) Internalism. Only information that is represented internally in the brain qualifies as the basis of 
knowledge.
(3) Achievability. The goals of science communication are actually achievable.
The three claims constitute a trilemma in the sense that the endorsement of two claims implies the 
rejection of the third claim: If we accept the complex model and still insist that the goals of science  
communication are achievable, then we have to reject internalism. If we want to keep the complex 
model and internalism, we have to conclude that successful science communication is actually not 
achievable. If we insist on internalism and achievability, we have to formulate a less ambitious 
model  of  science  communication.  I  think  that  we  should  react  to  this  dilemma  by  dropping 
internalism.  The persuasiveness  of  this  strategy largely depends  on the  availability  of  a  viable 
alternative. In the remainder of this article, I want to outline why externalism may provide an viable 
and actually quite attractive alternative.
IV Reshaping the concept of knowledge
In the last section,  I argued that internalism threatens the very possibility of successful science 
communication.  Given  the  large  amount  of  knowledge  that  is  needed  with  regard  to  very 
heterogeneous scientific topics, a restriction to information that is stored in the biological memory 
seems to  lead  to  a  cognitive  overload  for  everyone who attempts  to  understand enough  about 
scientific  issues  to  successfully  engage  with  the  role  of  science  and  technology  in  society. 
Furthermore, it seems obvious that externalism reshapes the concept of knowledge in a way that 
allows new strategies to deal with this problem. If external information resources can serve as part 
of subjects’ memory, external devices can play an decisive role in extending public knowledge 
about science and enabling public engagement with science. This is especially evident in the case of 
basic  factual  knowledge as it  has been tested by most public  understanding of science studies. 
Given the internalist  design of  these studies, subjects are not allowed to utilize their cognitive 
environments - they are not allowed to look up an answer in a notebook, ask a friend, use Google or 
Wikipedia, and so on. It is obvious that the results of externalist tests would show more optimistic  
results  -  especially,  if  the  tested  persons  have  online  access  to  resources  such  as  Google  or 
Wikipedia. 
While  the  argument  from  cognitive  overload  may  make  an  externalist  concept  of  knowledge 
attractive, there are also some rather obvious objections. First, there seems to be an intuitive case 
against externalism that insists that it would be simply  absurd  to extend someones memory and 
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knowledge beyond her biologically constituted cognition. The intuitive objection appears especially 
pressing in the light of examples such as the utilization of Wikipedia as an external memory. Access 
to Wikipedia allows access to literally millions of simple facts such as biographical data, population 
numbers, geographical coordinates, and so on. Doesn’t externalism imply that a person with quick 
and reliable access to Wikipedia has all of this knowledge because it is available in her cognitive 
environment? And wouldn’t it be absurd to accept this consequence?
Although  these  worries  are  understandable,  I  think  that  they  are  ultimately  misguided.  An 
“explosion of knowledge” through external information resources is actually not as absurd as it may 
appear  on  first  sight  and  can  provide  a  helpful  account  of  how  digital  media  and  mobile 
technologies  change  our  cognitive  economies.  People  who  make  mobile  access  to  online 
information  resources  such  as  Wikipedia  and  Google  part  of  their  second  nature,  alter  their 
cognitive routines profoundly and externalist  accounts provide an interpretation of this  process. 
Furthermore,  even  a  thorough  externalism  has  limits  and  cannot  include  all  parts  a  subject’s 
cognitive environment. For example, an externalist may claim that a person knows the biographical 
data of Albert Einstein because of her quick and reliable access to Wikipedia.  However, that does 
not  mean that  mobile  access  to  the  Wikipedia  article  on Einstein’s  theory of  relativity ensures 
understanding of that theory. 
Recall  that  I  have  introduced  externalism  through  a  contrast  with  internalist  studies  that  test 
knowledge about science without allowing subjects access to their normal cognitive environment. 
The basic idea of externalism in science communication is to reshape the concept of knowledge by 
removing the internalist restrictions of typical test designs. If we remove these restrictions, studies 
will evidently come to different results but they will also indicate limits of extended knowledge. A 
few examples can clarify the situation. Let us start with the knowledge of some simple facts such as 
Charles Darwin was born in 1809.  Internalists assume that a person knows that Charles Darwin 
was born in 1809 if and only if this information is stored and available in her biological memory. A 
internalist test would therefore not allow any external help in answering the question of Darwin’s 
birth year. Externalists allow people to access their normal cognitive environments and therefore 
allow the possibility that a person knows Darwin’s birth year even if she hasn’t stored it in her 
biological memory. Recall the example of Otto who has a lot of information including Darwin’s 
biographical  data  stored  in  his  notebook  and  therefore  has  reliable  and  quick  access  to  this 
information. If we do not exclude the cognitive environment, Otto will pass the test with the same 
ease as someone who has the information stored in her biological memory. The same is obviously 
true  of  everyone  who has  reliable  and quick  mobile  access  to  Wikipedia  and  can  retrieve  the 
biographical data online. 
However, even radical externalists will be happy to acknowledge that many people do not know 
Darwin’s birth year as they do not have a sufficiently robust access to this information. The most  
obvious possibility is that someone has no access to the information at all - not through a notebook, 
laptop, smart phone, print encyclopedia, or any other external information storage. In other cases, 
the information may be available in the cognitive environment but not accessible in a sufficiently 
robust way. For example, someone may only be able to access the information on a computer at  
work or at the local library. In both cases the information is only available at a specific location at a 
specific time and therefore the access is not reliable enough to constitute knowledge. The externalist 
test  condition  should  reflect  this  restriction  by  only  allowing  the  reliably  available  cognitive 
environment when testing knowledge about science.
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Another limit of external knowledge becomes apparent, when we move to more complex issues 
than birth  years.  Consider,  for  example,  knowledge of  complex scientific  theories.  It  would be 
absurd that a person with quick and reliable online access knows everything that is published in an 
open access journal, simply because the information is accessible online. The obvious reason is that 
genuine  knowledge  must  be  readily  available  for  further  consideration  while  the  extraction  of 
knowledge from scientific publications requires considerable time and cognitive effort. Again, the 
externalist reinterpretation of typical test of scientific literacy and knowledge reflect this limitation: 
We should ascribe someone knowledge about an issue  only if appropriate information is readily 
available for further consideration. However, a lot of complex scientific information in a scientific 
open access journal is usually not readily available for further consideration because its retrieval 
requires considerable time and cognitive labour.
The suggestion of reshaping the concept of knowledge about science by removing the internalist 
restrictions of typical tests of knowledge leaves many questions open. For example, I have talked 
about “quick and reliable access” without offering any suggestion of how to operationalize these 
conditions. Although this is a serious methodological issue, it is not entirely unique to externalist 
approaches. Any attempt to test knowledge about science will face similar methodological problems. 
Internalist  tests  will  also have  to  deal  with situations,  where  information  retrieval  is  somehow 
inconsistent, only available in specific contexts, or requires a lot of time. Although I do not want to 
downplay these issues, I assume that main point of the externalist proposal is independent of them. 
We can approach studies of knowledge about science in two crucially different ways: On the one 
hand, we can restrict knowledge to information that is stored in the biological memory. Although 
this approach matches traditional, internalist concepts of knowledge, it runs into trouble as it creates 
the  problem  of  cognitive  overload  that  threatens  the  very  possibility  of  successful  science 
communication.  On the other hand, we can reshape the concept of knowledge in a way that it 
includes quickly and reliably available information no matter whether it is stored in the biological 
memory or external information storages. This proposal requires some bold conceptual moves but 
also provides a conceptual framework that fits the needs of science communication studies better 
than traditional internalist accounts. 
V Conclusion: Technological optimism and its limits
In this article, I have argued that we should abandon internalism and instead adopt an account that 
accepts  externally  stored  knowledge  if  it  is  quickly  and  reliably  accessible  in  the  cognitive 
environment  of  a  subject.  This  reconzeptualization of  knowledge has  important  methodological 
consequences  as  it  suggests  different  test  designs  that  allow  the  utilization  of  the  cognitive 
environment.  Furthermore, the externalist  account may also lead to a normative reevaluation of 
science communication strategies and efforts: if external information resources realize externally 
stored knowledge, both access to and the quality of these information resources becomes of crucial 
importance for successful science communication. 
For  example,  externalism may provide a  reason for  science communicators  to join forces with 
computer  education/access  programs  that  try  to  close  the  digital  divide  (e.g.  Norris  2001, 
Warschauer 2004) between groups that have reliable access to online sources and groups that do not 
have  this  kind  of  access  or  at  least  not  the  media  competence  to  use  it  efficiently.  Given the 
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argument from cognitive overload, we may even go a step further:  only societies that are able to 
bridge the digital divide can hope to achieve a level of scientific literacy and knowledge about 
science that allows informed democratic decisions at the intersection of science, society, and policy 
making. 
So far, I have told a mostly optimistic story about the extension of knowledge through modern 
technologies: by creating quick and reliable access to external information resources, we also create 
externally stored knowledge that can play a crucial role in science communication efforts. Although 
this is indeed an encouraging story, one should certainly not slip into an uncritical technological 
utopism that misunderstands external information resources as a simple solution of all problems in 
scientific literacy and public engagement with science.
Important  limitations  of  extended  knowledge  become  obvious  when  we  look  at  the  public 
understanding of  complex scientific  issues.  As discussed  in  the  last  section,  the  complexity of 
scientific information sets limits to extended knowledge. No one has knowledge of everything that 
is published in an open access journal because the retrieval of most of the information requires 
considerable time and cognitive labour. A second limitation of externalism becomes apparent when 
we employ a more ambitious concept of understanding. Consider the case of evolutionary theory 
and the question to what extend access to Wikipedia articles such as “Evolution”, “Adaptation”, 
“Population Genetics”, “Evo-Devo”, “Evolutionary Psychology”, “Creationism”, and so on ensures 
understanding  of  issues  in  evolutionary  theory  or  even  issues  such  as  the  implications  of 
evolutionary  theory  for  human  self-understanding.  Access  to  Wikipedia  articles  is  clearly  not 
sufficient for an understanding of these issues. One reason is their complexity - although Wikipedia 
contains a lot of information, much of it is not readily available for further consideration and its  
retrieval requires too much time and cognitive labour to constitute knowledge. However, I do not 
think that the complexity of the information is the only reason why we think that access to these 
Wikipedia articles does not grant understanding of complex issues regarding evolutionary theory 
and its implications.  
Instead, I want to suggest that we often use the term “understanding” in a more ambitious way than 
“knowledge”.  In  order  to  truly  understand  a  complex  issue,  we  not  only  need  propositional 
knowledge but we also need to be able to consistently integrate this knowledge in our system of 
believes,  values,  and  actions.  Of  course,  complex  scientific  issues  are  often  dominated  by the 
division of cognitive labour and externalists can point out that we always rely on the work of others 
when we evaluate these issues and integrate them with our believes, values, and actions. However, 
even the most radical externalist will acknowledge that this process cannot be entirely external as it  
also requires integration with internally realized believes and values. Externally stored knowledge 
can be an important part of the understanding of complex scientific issues but a more ambitious 
concept of understanding will still set limits to externalism by also requiring consistent integration 
of externally stored knowledge with internally realized cognition. 
In addition to these limits in understanding complex scientific issues, there are further reasons that 
should make us suspicious of an overly optimistic technological outlook. In this article,  I have 
focused on how external information resources can realize extended knowledge. However, external 
information resources can contain all kinds of information, no matter whether it is accurate, biased, 
or outright wrong. Externalism claims that external information resources can constitute parts of 
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peoples’ believe  systems.  This  also  means  that   all  kinds  of  ideology and misinformation  can 
become part  of  believe  systems simply by being present  in  the  external  information  resources 
people rely on. To use a more drastic formulation and example: By editing a Wikipedia article, one 
can literally edit the believe systems of millions of people. By adding false or biased information to 
an Wikipedia article, one can add false or biased information to the believe systems of millions of 
people.
Externalism implies great opportunities for science communication but also new challenges. The 
growing importance of external knowledge resources in our cognitive economies creates the need 
for improved media competence as a crucial part of public engagement with science. This requires a 
shift in science communication practice but also theoretical reflection of the ideological power of 
external and digital  information resources. In this  sense, externalism provides an opportunity to 
reflect  the  dramatic  changes  that  digital  and  mobile  technologies  enforce  on  our  cognitive 
economies. 
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